show to gaping rustics at the fair, at least in cases where the owner objected. Readers of "Our Mutual Friend " will recall the discussion between Messrs. Venus and Wegg as to the right of the former to hold the latter's amputated leg by purchase. From a friendly motive he was "glad to restore it to the source from whence it flowed," but when Wegg " threw it out as a legal point" that "if he had consulted a lawyer " it was doubtful that Venus could "have kept this article back from" him, Venus declared he "would have seen him further " before he would have surrendered it without'being paid his price for it. " You can't buy human flesh and blood in this country, sir; not alive, you can't," says Wegg, shaking his head. ' ' Then query, bone?"
Personal Liability of Judges. — The very in teresting question of the civil liability of a judge to a suitor for malicious or corrupt conduct within his jurisdiction has recently arisen in England in a case of which we get the following reports from "Notes from London" in the "Scottish Law Review" for June.
"The plaintiff was a Dr. Anderson, a planter in Tobago and the defendants, Sir John Gorrie, the Chief Justice, and two of his puisne judges. Serious scandals arose some time ago in consequence of the maladmistration of justice in that island. Sir Frederick Pollock and Sir William Anson were sent out on a commission to take evidence; and, in consequence of their report, the defendants in the action were deposed from their offices. Dr. Anderson seems to have been the representative of the planting interest, and Sir John Gorrie to have made himself the champion of the natives. Actions were brought at the instigation of the Chief Justice against Dr. Anderson, who was fined oppressively, held to bail in excessive amounts, and finally, when he petitioned the Crown upon these matters, as he had the legal right to do, was imprisoned for contempt of court. Having procured the deposition of his judges, he commenced his action against them for $ 10,000 damages. Sir John Gorrie died after the action was commenced, one of the defendants obtained the ver dict of the jury before the trial was concluded, and only Mr. Justice Cook remained. The Lord Chief-Justice, in charging the jury, pointed out the necessity for securing the independence of judges acting judicially, but thought it monstrous to say, when a thing was done maliciously and corruptly, though within his jurisdiction, it was done judicially. The jury took the same view, and found for the plaintiff — damages, £500. Whereupon Lord Coleridge entered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the judge's privilege was absolute while acting within his jurisdiction, and that no action could be brought against him. In actions of slander brought against judges and counsel this seems to have been held, and is no doubt the law, but Lord Coleridge thought the law doubtful in the case he was hearing, and it was safer to enter judgment for the defendant, on the assumption that no action can be
brought against a judge acting within his jurisdiction, and leave it to be appealed. This will probably be done. It would have been better if Lord Coleridge had made up his mind earlier as to the necessity imposed upon him of entering judgment for the defendant, and thus saved much time and the expense of keeping a trial going from day to day when the result is a foregone conclusion." The leading case on this subject in this country is Lange v. Benedict, 73 New York, 12; 29 Am. Rep. 80. See also Busteed v. Parsons, 54 Ala. 393; 35 Am. Rep. 688, with a note at p. 694, on which the present writer spent a good deal of time. The doc trine indicated by Lord Coleridge's ruling seems well settled in both countries, but it has always seemed to us that the defendant Benedict in the case above cited acted without and outside of jurisdiction. Judge Folger made the best of a bad case for the protection of a brother judge.
Chance Verdicts. — In Wright v. Abbott, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, 36 N. E. Rep. 62, a quotient verdict was set aside, on the testimony of the officer in charge of the jury, who overheard their "deliberations." The Court said : — "It is certainly not the duty of an officer in charge of a jury to listen to the deliberations of a jury, but, if he does, his testimony cannot be excluded on the ground that his knowledge was obtained in this manner, if it is otherwise competent. The rule excluding testimony of the conduct of jurors in the jury room when deliberating upon a verdict ought to have some limits. It seems that in England it has been finally settled that the affidavit of a juror will not be received to show that the verdict was determined by lot (Vaise v. Delavai, I T. R., 11; Owen v. Warburton, I Bos. & P. 326; Straker v. Graham, 7 Dowl. 223, 225). The weight of authority in this country also is that the affidavits or the testimony of jurors to show such a fact will not be received (Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487; Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Bin. 150; Brewster v. Thompson, I. N.J. Law, 32. Grinnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. 540, is regarded as overruled in Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453,462). It has always been held that if a verdict is obtained by resorting to chance, or by drawing lots, it will be set aside (Mitchells. Ehle, 10 Wend. 595; Donner v. Palmer, 23 Cal. 40; Ruble v. McDonald, 7 Iowa, 90; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67; Dorr v. Fenno, 12 Pick. 520; Forbes v. Howard, 4 R. I. 364). In Vaise v. Delavai (ubi supra), where a verdict was obtained by tossing up, Lord Mansfield said : ' The Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jurymen themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high misdemeanor; but in every such case the Court must derive their knowledge from some other source, such as from some person having seen the transaction through a window, or by some other means.' In Wilson v. Berryman (5 Cal., 44) the verdict was what is called a 'quotient verdict'; and the Court, while con ceding that the affidavit of a juror could not be received, admitted the affidavit of the under-sheriff that the affidavit of the juror was true."
