may not thus voluntarily exhibit his voice. In Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222; S. c. 25 Am. Rep. 81, where a cashier undertook to identify a masked burglar by his voice, it was held not competent for the defendant "to prove what was his usual and natural voice, by using his voice in the court-room ' to repeat something,' when not under oath," as " there was no way of determining whether he would use his voice in the court room in a natural or in a constrained or simulated manner." He might have miti gated his voice, like Bottom, — put a mask on it, so to speak. But if he had sworn to his voice, the court seemed to imply that the ruling would have been different. And he may on request of the prosecution exhibit his voice by his own consent. In Johnson v. Com., 115 Penn. St. 369, at the request of the district attorney, the pris oner stood up and repeated certain words, in order to afford a witness, then " on the stand, an opportunity of seeing the prisoner and hearing the sound of his voice, so that she might the more intelligently testify whether he was or was not the man by whom she was confronted on the night in question." It did not appear that any ob jection or exception was taken, and the court held that the prisoner for this reason could not complain. But obiter the court said it could not be construed as a case of compel ling the prisoner " to give evidence against himself," and liken it to the right of search of premises for stolen property. (It is note worthy that at the same time, the districtattorney asking the prisoner to put on a slouched hat, and his counsel objecting, the request was not pressed.) But whether the defendant in a criminal case can be compelled to expose his person is a very serious question, on which the authorities are conflicting. In Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76, it was held error for the court to require the pris oner to stand up and show his leg in order to disclose where it had been amputated; and in Day v. State, 63 Ga. 669, it was held :
"Nor can one by force compel another against his consent to put his foot in a shoetrack, for the purpose of using it as evidence against him on the criminal side of the court." In People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, it was held that a prisoner on trial for crime cannot be required, against objection, to try on a shoe to determine whether tracks found at the scene of the offence were his own; nor if he objects, can he properly be required to measure the shoe after trying it on. But if he tries it on without objection, the ruling that he must measure it is not prejudicial error, as any witness could do it as well as he. In Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt. 619, it was held that the prisoner was not compellable to put his foot into a pan of mud brought into court. In McGuff v. State, 88 Ala. 147, on a charge of rape, the prosecutrix being a child of seven and one half years of age, the court held that it was not error to refuse to com pel an examination of the child by physi cians, in order to determine if she had been injured. On the other hand, it has been held that the prisoner may be compelled to furnish personal evidence of his identity by putting his foot in a track. State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646; s. c. 21 Am. Rep. 493; Walker v. State, 7 Tex. Ct. App. 245; s. c. 32 Am. Rep. 595. And in -State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79; s. c. 33 Am. Rep. 530, the defend ant was held compellable to expose his arm to determine whether there were tattoo marks on it as described by witnesses. This case was decided by a majority of one, and there was a powerful written opinion in dissent. In State v. Garrett. 71 N. C. 85; s. c. 17 Am. Rep. 1, the prisoner was held properly compelled to exhibit her hand, which she pre tended to have been burned. In Spencer v. State, 69 Ala. 159, it was held that the sub mission by a female defendant of her person to a private examination by physicians, is not a confession, although the result of the
