Page:The Green Bag (1889–1914), Volume 04.pdf/338

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The False Priest. sionary at the English consulate in Sidon, Syria. In Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas. 274 (1861), the same doctrine was held on the strength of Queen v. Millis, Campbell, Lord Chancellor, himself conceding it to have been established by that case " that there could never have been a valid marriage in England before the Reformation without the presence of a priest episcopally ordained, or after wards without the presence of a priest or of a deacon." The point of the decision was that the priest could not marry himself; the priest must be a third party, as a witness, and as having power to forbear to celebrate the marriage if proper objection should be made. In Hawke v. Corri, 2 Hag. Cons. 280, a suit for jactitation of marriage, Sir William Scott said : — "How the case may be, in a moral point of view, if it should prove that the person who solem nized the marriage was not a clergyman, and the paper not a license, to the knowledge of the party who held them out as such, no reasonable man can doubt. What it may be in legal consideration, it is not necessary for me to answer at present; but I am not quite prepared to say that a marriage contracted under such circumstances would neces sarily be pronounced null and void. . . . No case has been cited to me, in which it has been proved or has been laid down that an innocent woman, so imposed upon, would not be entitled to the com plete protection of the law. . . . But if the facts were simply these, that being a young unmarried woman, she was imposed upon by a pretended clergyman, and a supposititious license, the matter might perhaps be deemed an arguable point, whether a marriage, had under such an atrocious imposition practised upon her, might not bind the guilty artificer of such fraud. It seems to be a generally accredited opinion that if a marriage is had by the ministration of a person in the church, who is ostensibly in holy orders, and is not known or suspected by the parties to be otherwise, such marriage shall be supported. Parties who come to be married are not expected to ask for a sight of the minister's letters of orders, and if they saw them, could not be expected to inquire into their

authenticity. . . . And even if this special license were false, it might perhaps be considered by some as an arguable point, whether the same principle, which in favor of innocent parties supports the acts of a pretended clergyman, might not be in voked to uphold the authority of a supposititious instrument of license obtruded upon a party de ceived by so cruel a fraud; " etc. This case went upon the point that the plaintiff had publicly and privately declared himself to be defendant's husband, and this put upon him the burden of proof to the contrary. It did not appear whether the minister was an irregular one or a mere pre tender. The case is barely cited by Bishop, and not at all by Schouler nor by any other recent text-writer. The most extensive and learned treatment of this topic by a text-writer is to be found in Reeve on Domestic Relations (4th ed. p. 253). He says : — "There can be no doubt that the express words of the statute of Geo. II. has rendered those mar riages not celebrated as that statute directs, void. But I apprehend that by the provisions of the common law, marriages, although celebrated by a person not qualified by law, or in a manner for bidden by law, are valid. The conduct of the parties concerned has rendered them obnoxious to the penalties of the law; but such singular con duct is not a ground for impeaching the validity of the marriage. Until the civil wars, during the reign of Car. I., nothing can be found on this subject. For until that period it had not been sup posed that any person but one in holy orders could celebrate a marriage. . . . During the com monwealth the power of celebrating marriages was given to justices of the peace. And they were the only officers whom the law recognizes as pos sessing power to marry. Yet during the existence of this law it was determined that a marriage cele brated by one not in holy orders, though not a justice of the peace, was valid. After the Resto ration, the power of celebrating marriages was committed exclusively to the clergy of the Church of England. And yet we find the court of King's Bench issuing a prohibition to the spiritual court, because the validity of a marriage had in the face of a separate congregation was questioned in said