Meno.
Socrates, Meno.
If there are no teachers and no scholars, virtue cannot be taught.
Soc. And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of which there are neither teachers nor disciples?
Men. We have.
Soc. And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?
Men. There are not.
Soc. And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?
Men. That, I think, is true.
Soc. Then virtue cannot be taught?
Men. Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe, Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how did they come into existence?
But were we not mistaken in our view? There may be another guide to good action as well as knowledge. Soc. I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked that right and good action is possible to man under other guidance than that of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη);—and indeed if this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good men at all.
Men. How do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I mean that good men are necessarily useful or 97 profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must be so.
Men. Yes.
Soc. And in supposing that they will be useful only if they are true guides to us of action—there we were also right?
Men. Yes.
Soc. But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide unless he have knowledge (φρόνησις), in this we were wrong.
Men. What do you mean by the word 'right'?
Soc. I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither, would he not be a right and good guide?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. And a person who had a right opinion about the way, but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide also, might he not?
