Meno.
Socrates, Meno.
a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?
Men. True.
Soc. And the sanie may be said of temperance and quickness of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they are hurtful?
Men. Very true.
Soc. And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures, when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness; but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the opposite?
Men. That appears to be true.
And so all virtue must be a sort of wisdom or knowledge. Soc. If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?
Men. I quite agree.
Soc. And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?
Men. True.
Soc. And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish soul wrongly?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And is not this universally true of human nature? All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and89 so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue, as we say, is profitable?
Men. Certainly.
Virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom. Soc. And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom?
Men. I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very true.
