Meno.
Socrates, Meno.
And now, what is colour?
my definition of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or, more concisely, the limit of solid. Men. And now, Socrates, what is colour?
Soc. You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.
Men. When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.
Soc. A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers. Men. Why do you think so?
Soc. Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect, you have found out that I have a weakness for the fair, and therefore to humour you I must answer.
Men. Please do.
Soc. Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias, which is familiar to you?
Men. I should like nothing better.
Meno, Gorgias, and Empedocles are all agreed that colour is an effluence of existence, proportioned to certain passages. Soc. Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences of existence?
Men. Certainly.
Soc. And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
Men. Exactly.
Soc. And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of them are too small or too large?
Men. True.
Soc. And there is such a thing as sight?
Men. Yes.
Soc. And now, as Pindar says, 'read my meaning:'—colour is an effluence of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.
Men. That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.
Soc. Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in the habit of hearing: and your wit will have