Qu. 5. Whether it doth not ſuffice, that every aſſignable number of Parts may be contained in ſome aſſignable Magnitude? And whether it be not unneceſſary, as well as abſurd, to ſuppoſe that finite Extenſion is infinitely diviſible?
Qu. 6. Whether the Diagrams in a Geometrical Demonſtration are not to be conſidered, as Signs of all poſſible finite Figures, of all ſenſible and imaginable Extenſions or Magnitudes of the ſame kind?
Qu. 7. Whether it be poſſible to free Geometry from inſuperable Difficulties and Abſurdities, ſo long as either the abſtract general Idea of Extenſion, or abſolute external Extenſion be ſuppoſed its true Object?
Qu. 8. Whether the Notions of abſolute Time, abſolute Place, and abſolute Motion be not moſt abſtractedly Metaphyſical? Whether it be poſſible for us to meaſure, compute, or know them?
Qu. 9. Whether Mathematicians do not engage themſelves in Diſputes and Para-
