of x, or that o is nothing; which ſecond Suppoſition deſtroys my firſt, and is inconſiſtent with it, and therefore with every thing that ſuppoſeth it. I do nevertheleſs beg leave to retain , which is an Expreſſion obtained in virtue of my firſt Suppoſition, which neceſſarily preſuppoſeth ſuch Suppoſition, and which could not be obtained without it: All which ſeems a moſt inconſiſtent way of arguing, and ſuch as would not be allowed of in Divinity.
XV. Nothing is plainer than that no just Concluſion can be directly drawn from two inconſiſtent Suppoſitions. You may indeed ſuppoſe any thing poſſible: But afterwards you may not ſuppoſe any thing that deſtroys what you firſt ſuppoſed. Or if you do, you muſt begin de novo. If therefore you ſuppoſe that the Augments vaniſh, i. e. that there are no Augments, you are to begin again, and ſee what follows from ſuch Suppoſition. But nothing will follow to your purpoſe. You cannot by that means ever arrive at your Concluſion, or ſucceed in, what is called by
