pale cast of thought.’ He is ‘thought-sick.’ ‘The whole,’ says Schlegel, ‘is intended to show how a calculating consideration which aims at exhausting, so far as human foresight can, all the relations and possible consequences of a deed, cripples[1] the power of acting. . . . Hamlet is a hypocrite towards himself; his far-fetched scruples are often mere pretexts to cover his want of determination. . . . He has no firm belief in himself or in anything else. . . . He loses himself in labyrinths of thought.’ So Coleridge finds in Hamlet ‘an almost enormous intellectual activity and a proportionate aversion to real action consequent upon it’ (the aversion, that is to say, is consequent on the activity). Professor Dowden objects to this view, very justly, that it neglects the emotional side of Hamlet’s character, ‘which is quite as important as the intellectual’; but, with this supplement, he appears on the whole to adopt it. Hamlet, he says, ‘loses a sense of fact because with him each object and event transforms and expands itself into an idea. . . . He cannot steadily keep alive within himself a sense of the importance of any positive, limited thing,—a deed, for example.’ And Professor Dowden explains this condition by reference to Hamlet’s life. ‘When the play opens he has reached the age of thirty years. . . . and he has received culture of every kind except the culture of active life. During the reign of the strong-willed elder Hamlet there was no call to action for his meditative son. He has slipped on into years of full manhood still a haunter of the university, a student of philosophies, an amateur in art, a ponderer on the things of life and death, who has never formed a resolution or executed a deed’ (Shakspere, his Mind and Art, 4th ed., pp. 132, 133).
On the whole, the Schlegel-Coleridge theory (with or without Professor Dowden’s modification
- ↑ Not ‘must cripple,’ as the English translation has it.
