CRITO 385
Socrates. And it is true ; but still I find with sur- prise that the old argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may say the same of another proposition — that not life, but a good life, is to be chiefly Λ"alued.
Crito. Yes, that also remains unshaken.
Socrates. And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable one — that holds also ?
Crito. Yes, it does.
Socrates. From these premises I proceed to argue the question whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the Athenians ; and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the at- tempt ; but if not, I will abstain. The other consid- erations which you mention, of money and loss of character, and the duty of educating one's children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as ready to restore people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to death — and with as little reason. But now, since the argument has thus far prevailed, the only question which remains to be considered is, whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether in real- ity we shall not do rightly ; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remain- ins: here must not be allowed to enter into the calcu- lation.
Crito. I think that you are right, Socrates ; how then shall we proceed ?
Socrates. Let us consider the matter together, and do you either refute me if you can, and I will be con- vinced ; or else cease, my dear friend, from repeating to me that I ought to escape against the wishes of the
