which had not much Foundation in Nature, and also because they took no other Course, but that of Disputing.
That this insisting altogether on establish'd Axioms, is not the most useful Way, is not only clear in such airy Conceptions, which they managed; but also in those Things, which lye before every Man's observation, which belong to the Life and Passions, and Manners of Men; which, one would think, might be sooner reduc'd into standing Rules. As for example; to make a prudent Man in the Affairs of State, it is not enough to be well vers'd in all the Conclusions, which all the Politicians in the World have devis'd, or to be expert in the Nature of Government and Laws, Obedience and Rebellion, Peace and War: Nay rather a Man that relies altogether on such universal Precepts, is almost certain to miscarry. But there must be a Sagacity of Judgment in particular Things; a Dexterity in discerning the Advantages of Occasions; a Study of the Humour, and Interest of the People he is to govern: The same is to be found in Philosophy; a thousand fine Argumentations, and Fabricks in the Mind, concerning the Nature of Body, Quantity, Motion, and the like, if they only hover a-loof, and are not squar'd to particular Matters, they may give an empty Satisfaction, but no Benefit, and rather serve to swell, than fill the Soul.
But besides this, the very way of Disputing itself, and inferring one Thing from another alone, is not at all proper for the spreading of Knowledge. It serves admirably well indeed, in those Arts, where the Connection between the Propositions is necessary, as in the Mathematicks, in which a long Train of Demonstrations, may be truly collected, from the certainty of
