638 L I G U R I confuse them with each other. But every sin which, considered in itself, is mortal, becomes venial if any one of these three conditions be absent : full advertence and deliberation ; entire consent ; for the most part, gravity of the subject matter. Insufficient deliberation may be known in three ways: imperfect consciousness of the sinfulness of the act, as if one were half asleep ; subsequent regret, and a conviction that you would not have done the act had you fully apprehended it ; such disturbance, through passion, alarm, or distraction, as to confuse the sense of what you were doing. Imperfect consent is established by the presence of a doubt in any one s mind whether he did really consent ; by the habitual disposition being that of regarding mortal sin as a worse evil than death ; by consciousness of having proceeded very timidly and hesitatingly in the action ; by being half asleep, so as to be only doubtfully conscious, and being of opinion that the act would not have been done in case of full possession of the senses. And gravity of the subject matter is to be decided, not merely on the merits of the thing in itself, but in its relation to the end proposed by the agent. If it make but little for this end, it is trifling ; if much, then it becomes serious (Theol. Mor., ii. 54, 55, 56). It is obvious that each of these subdivided qualifications admits of indefinite hair-splitting, and so that the security apparently provided by the general distinction between mortal and venial sins is elusive. It is true that there are also causes which will raise a venial sin to the rank of mortal ; but the ascending process is more uncertain and difficult than the descending one. A venial sin, committed deliberately as a stepping-stone to a mortal sin, is to be judged in respect of this its object, and so becomes mortal. A venial sin, so passionately clung to as to make its votary ready to commit a mortal sin rather than forego its indul gence, also becomes mortal. But in neither of these cases is it necessary to confess the venial sin, only the mortal sin to which it has led up. The third mode of a venial sin becoming mortal is when it is committed with the formal and express purpose of disobedience to a superior, or to a precept, just because it is a precept. And in this case alone, because of the supreme place given to obedience in the Roman system, wherein it is not only the first and highest of virtues, but practically almost the only one insisted on for all, there is no manner of withdrawal from the category of mortal sins (Theol. Mor., ii 59, 60, 61). So far, only the general principles on which Liguori s system is based have been explained. It next remains to exhibit their prac tical application, both as regards his own statements and also as regards those opinions of other casuists which, though not accepting them for himself, he yet embodies without censure in his work, thereby giving them the character and sanction of probability. It will simplify the inquiry to limit it mainly, though not exclusively, to the teaching on falsehood and theft. Both of these are declared by Liguori to be sins of grave charac ter, and in regard to the former he cites, amongst other authori tative condemnations, these words of Pope Innocent III. : "Not even to defend our life is it lawful to speak falsely. " He adds that persons who are being lawfully questioned by such as have a right to interrogate, as judges in court, or a priest in the confessional, are bound to disclose truly all that they know of the matter inquired into. Those who are questioned by such as have no right to interrogate them, or are questioned irregularly by lawful authority, are not bound to communicate their knowledge, and may set aside and avoid such questioning by any lawful means, such means however, not including falsehood, nor answers made with mental reservation, making the words actually spoken false, this latter mode^of evasion having been formally condemned by Innocent XI. in 1679, though it was permitted by the casuists of the immediately preceding period. This is all tenable enough, but its apparent force is easily reduced by a little ingenuity. In the first place, he distinguishes amphibology or equivocation from mental reservation, and names three varieties of equivocation : (1) that of a word having two quite different senses, as volo in Latin means to "wish" and to " fly," to which may be added the fre quent English ambiguity of two distinct words having the samesound, as air and heir; (2) a sentence having two main meanings, as This book is Peter s," which may signify his ownership or his author ship ; (3) that of words having two senses, one more common than the other, or one literal and the other metaphorical. The example he gives of this last form is the phrase " 1 say No," uttered by a person who wishes to conceal something as to which he is ques tioned. The words seem to his hearer to denote express denial of the fact ; the meaning in which he uses them is merely " I utter the word No, " this sentence being complete in itself. "It is certain," adds Liguori, "and the common opinion of all, that it is lawful for a just cause to use equivocation in the manners described, and to confirm it with an oath. . . . And the reason is because we do not then deceive our neighbour, but for a just cause permit him to deceive himself ; and besides, we are not bound, if there be a just cause, to speak so that others may understand. And any honest object for retaining any good things that are useful to our body or spirit may be a just cause" (Tlwol. Mor., iv. 151). But suppose that it is impossible to allege a just cause, is it then mortal sin to swear with such equivocation ? Some of the stricter casuists say so, but Liguori sides with the laxists, and declares it merely venial, except in a court of law or in formal contracts, alleging that, save in these two cases, any reasonable cause, such as desire to be quit of troublesome and irregular questioning, is sufficient to mitigate the sin. He adds, however, two cautions that a more serious cause is required to justify equivocation with an oath than without one, and that, in proportion as the equivocal words employed give greater occasion for mistake, a graver cause is required for their proper use, a qualification instantly modified by the next clause, which lays down that, irk** words which are in themselves equivocal, having two equally valid meanings, are used, then they give little or no cause for error, and may be used on the very lightest grounds. Next, as to mental reservation, or "restriction," which is the technical name, this was expressly condemned in three propositions by Innocent XL, forbidding it in all cases. According to the analogy of all prohibitory laws, this general prohibition of the genus should include prohibition of all the species also. But the casuists, unable to oppose direct resistance to the papal decree, have turned its flank by inventing a new distinction which was unknown in 1679. They have now divided mental restriction into two main heads, the first of which, absolute or "pure" mental restriction (by which is meant such reservation as cannot possibly be observed by the hearers, or conjectured from the attendant circumstances), is always illicit, whether with or without an oath. But "non-pure" mental restriction (that is, such as may conceivably be observed and inferred from attending circumstances, such as an in audible whisper, or a qualifying gesture) does not, they allege, fall under the ban of Innocent XL, and is always lawful for a just cause. " The reason of this opinion is that, if it were not permissible to use non-pure mental restriction, there would be no lawful means of con cealing a secret, which one could not disclose without loss or incon venience, which would be as hurtful as lying to human intercourse. And therefore the condemnation passed by the pope on mental restriction is rightly to be understood of a restriction taken absolutely and strictly, for that alone can be called true mental restriction which takes place in the mind alone, and so remains hidden, and can in no wise be recognized from external circumstances" (Theol. Mor., iv. 152). And the following illustrations are supplied. (1) A confessor may affirm with an oath that he is ignorant of a crime which he has heard in confession, secretly meaning thereby that he is ignorant of it as a mere man, though not as a minister of religion. (2) An accused or a witness, it irregularly questioned by the judge in court, may swear that he knows nothing of a crime which he does in fact know of, understanding thereby that he does not know it so as to be legally bound to answer or depose concerning it. This alarming proposition is apparently corrected by the warning that, when the interrogation of the judge is in due form, then the person questioned is bound to obedience, and barred from all equivocation. But this safeguard is at once fatally weakened by the further pro visions that, if the act be not a crime in the witness s opinion, he need not disclose it, and that if the crime be altogether hidden (i.e., where only the criminal himself and the witness know the facts), the witness is not merely permitted, but is actually bound, to say that the accused did not commit it. And the accused is equally free to do so, unless there be already half-full" proof against him, because, in the absence of such a degree of presumption, the judge has no legitimate right to question him as to his guilt. Those who have deceived the court by such sworn equivocation are, Liguori rules, entitled to absolution without the declaration of the truth being imposed as a condition. 1 (3) A needy man, who has made 1 Akin to this teaching is the maxim laid down in another place, that it is lawful to procure the giving of perjured evidence, " if you have a great interest in employing perjury to expose the fraud of another person in order to obtain your own rights" (Theol. Mor., iii. 3, 77), with which may be coupled the permission for suitors to offer and for judges to take bribes for expediting causes, so long as the bribing is not expressly for delivering false judgment (Ibid., v. 196, 212).
