becomes partly transformed into an effort, and its product, the idea, becomes in the same proportion less and less intense till a position of equilibrium is reached ; and then at length the remainders coalesce. We have thus a statics- and a mechanics of mind which investigate respectively the conditions of equilibrium and of move ment among presentations. In the statics two magnitudes have to be determined : (1) the amount of the suppression or inhibition (Hcmmungssummc), and (2) the ratio in which this is shared among the opposing presentations. The first must obviously be as small as possible : thus for two totally-opposed presentations a and b, of which a is the greater, the inhibendum = b. For a given degree of opposition this burden will be shared between the conflicting pre sentations in the inverse ratio of their strength. When its remainder after inhibition = 0, a presentation is said to be on the threshold of consciousness, for on a small diminution of the inhibition the "effort" will become actual presentation in the same proportion. Such total exclusion from consciousness is, however, manifestly im possible with only two presentations,[1] though with three or a greater number the residual value of one may even be negative. The first and simplest law in psychological mechanics relates to the " sinking" of inhibited presentations. As the presentations yield to the pressure, the pressure itself diminishes, so that the velocity of sinking decreases, i.e., we have the equation, (S tr) dt = d<r, where S is the total inhibendum, and a the intensity actually in- hibi ted after the time t. Hence t = log , and <r = S (1 - e" ( ). From this law it follows, for example, that equilibrium is never quite obtained for those presentations which continue above the threshold of consciousness, while the rest which cannot so continue are very speedily driven beyond the threshold. More important is the law according to which a presentation freed from inhibition and rising anew into consciousness tends to raise the other presentations with which it is combined. Suppose two presentations p and ir united by the residua r and p ; then the amoimt of //s " help " to IT is /, the portion of which appropriated by TT is given by the ratio p : TT ; and thus the initial help is .
But after a time t, when a portion of p represented by has been actually brought into consciousness, the help afforded in the next instant will be found by the equation
,
from which by integration we have the value of ,
.
So that if there are several TTS connected with p by smaller and smaller parts, there will be a definite " serial " order in which they will be revived by^? ; and on this fact Herbart rests all the pheno mena of the so-called faculty of memory, the development of spatial and temporal forms, and much besides. Emotions and volitions, he holds, are not directly self-preservations of the soul, as our presenta tions are, but variable states of such presentations resulting from their interaction when above the threshold of consciousness. Thus when some presentations tend to force a presentation into conscious ness, and others at the same time tend to drive it out, that presentation is the seat of painful feeling ; when, on the other hand, its entrance is favoured by all, pleasure results. Desires are presentations strug gling into consciousness against hindrances, and when accompanied by the supposition of success become volitions. Transcendental freedom of will in Kant s sense is an impossibility. Self-conscious ness is the result of an interaction essentially the same in kind as that which takes place when a comparatively simple presentation finds the field of consciousness occupied by a long-formed and well- consolidated "mass" of presentations as, e.g., one s business or garden, the theatre, &c. , which promptly inhibit the isolated pre sentation if incongruent, and unite it to themselves if not. What we call Self is, above all, such a central mass, and Herbart seeks to show with great ingenuity and detail how this position is occupied at first chiefly by the body, then by the seat of ideas and desires, and finally by that first-personal Self which recollects the past and resolves con cerning the future. But at any stage the actual constituents of this "complexion are variable; the concrete presentation of Self is never twice the same. And, therefore, finding on reflexion any par ticular concrete factor contingent, we abstract the position from that which occupies it, and so reach the speculative notion of the pure Ego.
JE>ttlwtics elaborates the "ideas" involved in the expression of taste called forth by those relations of object which acquire for them the attribution of beauty or the reverse. The beautiful (KO.OV) is to be carefully distinguished from the allied conceptions of the useful and the pleasant, which vary with time, place, and person ; whereas beauty is predicated absolutely and involuntarily by all who have attained the right standpoint. Ethics, which is but one branch of aesthetics, although the chief, deals with such relations among volitions ( IVillensvcrhaltnissc) as thus unconditionally please or displease. These relations Herbart finds to be reducible to five, which do not admit of further simplification ; and corre sponding to them are as many moral ideas (Musterbegriffc viz. : (1) Internal Freedom, the underlying relation being that of the individual s will to his judgment of it ; (2) Perfection, the relation being that of his several volitions to each other in respect of intensity, variety, and concentration ; (3) Benevolence, the relation being that between his own will and the thought of another s ; (4) Eight, in case of actual conflict with another ; and (5) Retribution or Equity, for intended good or evil done. The ideas of a final society, a system of rewards and punishments, a system of adminis tration, a system of culture, and a " unanimated society," corre sponding to the ideas of law, equity, benevolence, perfection, and internal freedom respectively, result when we take account of a number of individuals. Virtue is the perfect conformity of the will with the moral ideas ; of this the single virtues are but special expressions. The conception of duty arises from the existence of hindrances to the attainment of virtue. A general scheme of prin ciples of conduct is possible, but the subsumption of special cases under these must remain matter of tact. The application of ethics to things as they are with a view to the realization of the moral ideas is moral technology (Tugendlehre), of which the chief divisions are Pedagogy and Politics.
In Theology Herbart held the argument from design to be as valid for divine activity as for human, and to justify the belief in a supersensible real, concerning which, however, exact knowledge is neither attainable nor on practical grounds desirable.
Among the post-Kantian philosophers Herbart doubtless ranks next to Hegel in importance, and this without taking into account his very great contributions to the science of education. His dis ciples speak of theirs as the " exact philosophy," and the term well expresses their master s chief excellence and the character of the chief influence he has exerted upon succeeding thinkers of his own and other schools. His criticisms are worth more than his construc tions ; indeed for exactness and penetration of thought he is quite on a level with Hume and Kant. His merits in this respect, how ever, can only be appraised by the study of his works at first hand. But we are most of all indebted to Herbart for the enormous advance psychology has been enabled to make, thanks to his fruit ful treatment of it, albeit as yet but few among the many who have appropriated and improved his materials have ventured to adopt his metaphysical and mathematical foundations.
- ↑ Thus, taking the case above supposed, the share of the inhibendum falling to the smaller presentation b is the fourth term of the propor tion a + b : a : : b : - - ; and so b s remainder is b - = - a+b a+b a+b which only = when a o .
