Not unnaturally, in the circumstances the Persians hailed the advent of the English fleet with delight. Their hatred of the Portuguese was intense, and they realized that in the English they might obtain an ally whose assistance would be invaluable to them. Without loss of time they made overtures to the English commanders for co-operation, offering substantial inducements in the shape of trading concessions and backing their requests for assistance with the argument that as the fight with the Portuguese had been precipitated by the favour shown by the Shah to the English the latter were in duty bound to stand by them. The Persian appeal had a warm advocate in Edward Monnox, the chief English factor in Persia, who had come down to the coast on his recall by the Company, and who had brought with him a strong impression of the supreme importance of making a bold bid for the reversion of the position which Portugal had so long maintained in the Shah's dominions.
Neither Blyth nor Weddell was eager to take upon himself the burden of the great responsibility of joining the Persians against the Portuguese. It was one thing to resist an unprovoked attack and quite another thing to enter a conflict in which the Company had no direct interest and that as an ally of an Asiatic power. And quite apart from considerations of moral expediency there was the danger to be faced of taking the offensive against the well-equipped vessels of Ruy Freire's fleet. A reverse would be disastrous to the Company's position in the Gulf, and it would seriously imperil the whole fortunes of the English in the East. Probably, if left to themselves, the two commanders would have found some excuse for non-compliance, but Monnox was at their elbow in their councils, and his zeal for a Persian understanding eventually carried the day.
