Page:EB1911 - Volume 07.djvu/207

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190
CORPORATION

duty. But such offences are now specially provided for by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (§§ 220-238); and where the provisions of that statute are available, corporal punishment would probably be illegal.

As to corporal punishment in the army and navy, see articles Military Law; Navy. In civil prisons, whether they are convict prisons or local prisons, corporal punishment may not be inflicted except under sentence of a competent court, or except in the case of prisoners under sentence of penal servitude, or convicted of felony, or sentenced to hard labour, who have been guilty of mutiny or incitement to mutiny, or of gross personal violence to an officer or servant of the prison (Act of 1898, § 5). Flogging for these offences in prison may not be inflicted except by order of the board of visitors or visiting committee of the prison, made at a meeting specially constituted, and confirmed by a secretary of state (Prison Act of 1898, § 5; Convict Prison Rules 1899; Stat. R. and O. 1899, No. 321, rr. 77-79; Local Prison Rules 1899; Stat. R. and O. 1899, No. 322, rr. 84, 85). The mode of inflicting the punishment is prescribed by the Convict Prison Rules (rr. 82-85) and the Local Prison Rules (rr. 88-91), which limit the number of strokes and prescribe the instrument to be used for inflicting them, the cat or birch for prisoners over 18, and the birch for prisoners under 18.

Corporal punishment for breaches of prison discipline in Scottish prisons is not authorized by any statute nor under the Scottish Prison Rules (see Stat. R. and O. Revised, ed. 1904, vol. X. tit. “Prison, Scotland,” p. 60). In Irish convict prisons corporal punishment may be inflicted by order of justices specially appointed by the lord-lieutenant under § 3 of the Penal Servitude Act 1864, but the Irish Prison Rules of 1902 (Stat. R. and O. 1902, No. 590) contain no reference to this power.

At common law, courts of justice had jurisdiction to impose a sentence of whipping on persons convicted on indictment for petty larceny or misdemeanours of the meaner kind (see 1 Bishop, Amer. Cr. Law, 8th ed., § 942). But they do not now impose such sentence except under statutory authority. The whipping of women was absolutely prohibited in 1820 by the Whipping of Female Offenders Abolition Act of that year. But there are numerous statutes authorizing the imposition of a sentence of whipping on male offenders. The following cases may be noted. 1. Adults: (a) who are incorrigible rogues (Vagrancy Act 1824, § 10); (b) who discharge fire-arms, &c., with intent to injure or alarm the sovereign (Treason Act 1842, § 2, and see 8 St. Tr. N.S. 1, and O’Connor’s Case, 1872, ib. p. 3 n.); (c) who are guilty of robbery with violence (Larceny Act 1861, § 43), or offences against § 21 of the Offences against the Person Act of 1861; there has been much controversy as to whether the Garrotters Act of 1861, which authorized the ordering of more than one whipping in the case of an offender over 16 years of age, was the effective cause of the diminution of the offences against which it was directed, but the best judicial opinion is in the affirmative. 2. Males under sixteen: (a) in any of the cases above noted; (b) for many statutory offences, e.g. larceny (Larceny Act 1861), malicious damage (Malicious Damage Act 1861, § 75; Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, § 4); (c) by courts of summary jurisdiction (Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, §§ 10, 11, and 1899; First Offenders Act 1887); if a boy is over 7 and under 12, not more than 6 strokes, if he is over 12, but under 14, not more than 12 strokes may be inflicted; the birch-rod is to be used, and the punishment is to be given by a police constable in the presence of a superior officer, and of the parent or guardian if he desire it.

In Scotland the whipping of male offenders under 14 is regulated by the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1860, § 74, the Whipping Act 1862, and § 514 of the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1892; and offenders over 16 may not be whipped for offences against person or property (Whipping Act 1862, § 2).

In Ireland the law is in substance the same as in England; for special statutes see official Index to Statutes (ed. 1905), p. 985, art. Punishment, 6.

The flogging of women is prohibited throughout British India (Code of Criminal Procedure, Act v. of 1898, § 393) and the British colonies, where the infliction of corporal punishment by judicial order is in the main regulated on the lines of modern English legislation. In some British colonies the list of offences punishable by whipping is larger than in England (see Queensland Criminal Code 1899, arts. 212, 213, 216).

In the United States whipping is not a legal punishment under the Federal Law (Revised Stats. U.S. § 5327). But in some of the states of the Union whipping is inflicted under statute, and is not held cruel or unusual within the Federal Constitution (1 Bishop, Amer. Crim. Law, 8th ed., § 947). In Delaware wife-beating and certain offences against property by males are punishable with flogging; and in Maryland the same punishment is applicable for wife-beating. Flogging is in force as a disciplinary measure in some penal institutions.

It has been suggested by Laurent (Principes de droit civil français (1870), vol. iv. § 275) that the express definition in the French Code Civil (arts. 371 et seq.) of parental rights over children excludes the power of corporal punishment. But this view is not generally accepted. The parental right of moderate chastisement is expressly reserved in the Civil Code of Spain (art. 155, 2). Flogging is not recognized as a legal punishment by the French Code Pénal, nor by the Penal Codes of Germany, Italy, Spain or Portugal. (See also Whipping or Flogging.) (A. W. R.) 


CORPORATION (from Lat. corporare, to form into a body, corpus, corporis), in English law, an association of persons which is treated in many respects as if it were itself a person. It has rights and duties of its own which are not the rights and duties of the individual members thereof. Thus a corporation may own land, but the individual members of the corporation have no rights therein. A corporation may owe money, but the corporators as individuals are under no obligation to pay the debt. The rights and duties descend to the successive members of the corporation. This capacity of perpetual succession is regarded as the distinguishing feature of corporations as compared with other societies. One of the phrases most commonly met with in law-books describes a corporation as a society with perpetual succession and a common seal. The latter point, however, is not conclusive of the corporate character.

The legal attributes of a corporation have been worked out with great fulness and ingenuity in English law, but the conception has been taken full-grown from the law of Rome. The term in Roman law corresponding to the modern corporation is collegium; a more general term is universitas. A collegium or corpus must have consisted of at least three persons, who were said to be corporati—habere corpus. They could hold property in common and had a common chest. They might sue and be sued by their agent (syndicus or actor). There was a complete separation in law between the rights of the collegium as a body and those of its individual members. The collegium remained in existence although all its original members were changed. It was governed by its own by-laws, provided these were not contrary to the common law. The power of forming collegia was restrained, and societies pretending to act as corporations were often suppressed. In all these points the collegia of Roman closely resemble the corporations of English law. There is a similar parallel between the purposes for which the formation of such societies is authorized in English and in Roman law. Thus among the Roman collegia the following classes are distinguished:—(1) Public governing bodies, or municipalities, civitates; (2) religious societies, such as the collegia of priests and Vestal Virgins; (3) official societies, e.g. the scribae, employed in the administration of the state; (4) trade societies, e.g. fabri, pictores, navicularii, &c. This class shades down into the societates not incorporated, just as our own trading corporations partake largely of the character of ordinary partnerships. In the later Roman law the distinction of corporations into civil and ecclesiastical, into lay and eleemosynary, is recognized. The latter could not alienate without just cause, nor take land without a licence—a restriction which may be compared with modern statutes of mortmain. All these privileged societies are what we should call corporations aggregate. The corporation sole (i.e. consisting of only a single person) is a later refinement, for although Roman law held that the corporation subsisted in full force, notwithstanding that only one member survived, it did not impute to the successive holders of a public office the character of a corporation. When a public officer in English law is said to be a corporation sole, the meaning is that the rights acquired by him in that capacity descend to his successor in office, and not (as the case is where a public officer is not a corporation) to his ordinary legal representative. The best known instances of