passions, appetites and desires there are some whose tendency is as clearly towards the general good as that of others is towards the satisfaction of the self. Finally, that principle in man which reflects upon actions and the springs of actions, unmistakably sets the stamp of its approbation upon conduct that tends towards the general good. It is clear, therefore, that from this point of view the sum of practical morals might be given in Butler’s own words—“that mankind is a community, that we all stand in a relation to each other, that there is a public end and interest of society, which each particular is obliged to promote.” But deeper questions remain.
The threefold division into passions and affections, self-love and benevolence, and conscience, is Butler’s celebrated analysis of human nature as found in his first sermon. But by regarding benevolence less as a definite desire for the general good as such than as kind affection for particular individuals, he practically eliminates it as a regulative principle and reduces the authorities in the polity of the soul to two—conscience and self-love.
But the idea of human nature is not completely expressed by saying that it consists of reason and the several passions. “Whoever thinks it worth while to consider this matter thoroughly should begin by stating to himself exactly the idea of a system, economy or constitution of any particular nature; and he will, I suppose, find that it is one or a whole, made up of several parts, but yet that the several parts, even considered as a whole, do not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which these parts have to each other.” This fruitful conception of man’s ethical nature as an organic unity Butler owes directly to Shaftesbury and indirectly to Aristotle; it is the strength and clearness with which he has grasped it that gives peculiar value to his system.
The special relation among the parts of our nature to which Butler alludes is the subordination of the particular passions to the universal principle of reflection or conscience. This relation is the peculiarity, the cross, of man; and when it is said that virtue consists in following nature, we mean that it consists in pursuing the course of conduct dictated by this superior faculty. Man’s function is not fulfilled by obeying the passions, or even cool self-love, but by obeying conscience. That conscience has a natural supremacy, that it is superior in kind, is evident from the part it plays in the moral constitution. We judge a man to have acted wrongly, i.e. unnaturally, when he allows the gratification of a passion to injure his happiness, i.e. when he acts in accordance with passion and against self-love. It would be impossible to pass this judgment if self-love were not regarded as superior in kind to the passions, and this superiority results from the fact that it is the peculiar province of self-love to take a view of the several passions and decide as to their relative importance. But there is in man a faculty which takes into consideration all the springs of action, including self-love, and passes judgment upon them, approving some and condemning others. From its very nature this faculty is supreme in authority, if not in power; it reflects upon all the other active powers, and pronounces absolutely upon their moral quality. Superintendency and authority are constituent parts of its very idea. We are under obligation to obey the law revealed in the judgments of this faculty, for it is the law of our nature. And to this a religious sanction may be added, for “consciousness of a rule or guide of action, in creatures capable of considering it as given them by their Maker, not only raises immediately a sense of duty, but also a sense of security in following it, and a sense of danger in deviating from it.” Virtue then consists in following the true law of our nature, that is, conscience. Butler, however, is by no means very explicit in his analysis of the functions to be ascribed to conscience. He calls it the Principle of Reflection, the Reflex Principle of Approbation, and assigns to it as its province the motives or propensions to action. It takes a view of these, approves or disapproves, impels to or restrains from action. But at times he uses language that almost compels one to attribute to him the popular view of conscience as passing its judgments with unerring certainty on individual acts. Indeed his theory is weakest exactly at the point where the real difficulty begins. We get from him no satisfactory answer to the inquiry, What course of action is approved by conscience? Every one, he seems to think, knows what virtue is, and a philosophy of ethics is complete if it can be shown that such a course of action harmonizes with human nature. When pressed still further, he points to justice, veracity and the common good as comprehensive ethical ends. His whole view of the moral government led him to look upon human nature and virtue as connected by a sort of pre-established harmony. His ethical principle has in it no possibility of development into a system of actual duties; it has no content. Even on the formal side it is a little difficult to see what part conscience plays. It seems merely to set the stamp of its approbation on certain courses of action to which we are led by the various passions and affections; it has in itself no originating power. How or why it approves of some and not of others is left unexplained. Butler’s moral theory, like those of his English contemporaries and successors, is defective from not perceiving that the notion of duty can have real significance only when connected with the will or practical reason, and that only in reason which wills itself have we a principle capable of development into an ethical system. It has received very small consideration at the hands of German historians of ethics.
Authorities.—See T. Bartlett, Memoirs of Butler (1839). The standard edition of Butler’s works is that in 2 vols. (Oxford, 1844). Editions of the Analogy are very numerous; that by Bishop William Fitzgerald (1849) contains a valuable Life and Notes. W. Whewell published an edition of the Three Sermons, with Introduction. Modern editions of the Works are those by W. E. Gladstone (2 vols. with a 3rd vol. of Studies Subsidiary, 1896), and J. H. Bernard, (2 vols. in the English Theological Library, 1900). For the history of the religious works contemporary with the Analogy, see Lechler, Gesch. d. Engl. Deismus; M. Pattison, in Essays and Reviews; W. Hunt, Religious Thought in England, vols., ii. and iii.; L. Stephen, English Thought in the 18th Century; J. H. Overton and F. Relton, The English Church from the Accession of George I. to the End of the 18th Century. (R. Ad.; A. J. G.)
BUTLER, NICHOLAS MURRAY (1862–), American educator, was born at Elizabeth, New Jersey, on the 2nd of April 1862. He graduated at Columbia College in 1882, was a graduate fellow in philosophy there from 1882 to 1884, when he took the degree of Ph.D., and then studied for a year in Paris and Berlin. He was an assistant in philosophy at Columbia in 1885–1886, tutor in 1886–1889, adjunct professor of philosophy, ethics and psychology in 1889–1890, becoming full professor in 1890, and dean of the faculty of philosophy in 1890–1902. From 1887 until 1891 he was the first president of the New York college for the training of teachers (later the Teachers’ College of Columbia University), which he had personally planned and organized. In 1891 he founded and afterwards edited the Educational Review, an influential educational magazine. He soon came to be looked upon as one of the foremost authorities on educational matters in America, and in 1894 was elected president of the National Educational Association. He was also a member of the New Jersey state board of education from 1887 to 1895, and was president of the Paterson (N.J.) board of education in 1892–1893. In 1901 he succeeded Seth Low as president of Columbia University. Besides editing several series of books, including “The Great Educators” and “The Teachers’ Professional Library,” he published The Meaning of Education (1898), a collection of essays; and two series of addresses, True and False Democracy (1907), and The American as he is (1908).
BUTLER (or Boteler), SAMUEL (1612–1680), English poet, author of Hudibras, son of Samuel Butler, a small farmer, was baptized at Strensham, Worcestershire, on the 8th of February 1612. He was educated at the King’s school, Worcester, under Henry Bright, the record of whose zeal as a teacher is preserved by Fuller (Worthies, Worcestershire). After leaving school he served a Mr Jeffereys of Earl’s Croome, Worcestershire, in the capacity of justice’s clerk, and is supposed to have thus gained his knowledge of law and law terms. He also employed himself at Earl’s Croome in general study, and particularly in painting, which he is said to have thought of adopting as a profession. It is probable, however, that art has not lost by his change of mind, for, according to one of his editors, in 1774 his pictures “served to stop windows and save the tax; indeed they were not fit for much else.” He was then recommended to Elizabeth, countess of Kent. At her home at Wrest, Bedfordshire, he had access to a good library, and there too he met Selden, who sometimes employed him as his secretary. But his third sojourn, with Sir Samuel Luke at Cople Hoo, Bedfordshire, was not only apparently the longest, but also much the most important in its effects on his career and works. We are nowhere informed in what capacity Butler served Sir Samuel Luke, or how he came to reside in the house of a noted Puritan and Parliament man. In the family of this “valiant Mamaluke,” who, whether he was or was not the original of Hudibras, was certainly a rigid Presbyterian, “a colonel in the army of the Parliament, scoutmaster-general for Bedfordshire and governor of Newport Pagnell,” Butler must have had the most abundant opportunities of studying from the life those who were to be the victims of his satire; he is supposed to have taken some hints for his caricature from Sir Henry Rosewell of Ford Abbey, Devonshire. But we know nothing positive of him until the Restoration, when he was appointed secretary to Richard Vaughan, 2nd earl of Carbery, lord president of the principality of Wales, who made him steward of Ludlow Castle, an office which he held from January 1661
