the tenacity to the Pan-Serbian idea in the political circles of the Serbian world.
Our leaders had to consider more and more what steps could be taken io put an end to this danger. I was convinced that Serbia must either be isolated and then broken by means of a war, or forced to adopt a course which would lead them to abandon the Pan-Serbian idea and to approach us in a genuine spirit. It was quite clear in my mind that this object could only be achieved without a European war if our foreign policv was given a certain change of direction.
In order to solve this problem, it was necessary to ensure inaction in connection with the Serbian question on the part of the two opposed groups of states. I considered this scheme practicable. There was no direct opposition between Austria-Hungary and France and England. It was obvious that an agreement was possible with Grey, and that Kngland regarded our position in the Balkans as harmless. We had to make use of this situation by becoming, as it were, the go-between between England and Germany; for it was the conflict of these two states which had created the difificultv of our political situation. There were means of finding an agreement; the only problem was to find the means. Distrust and hatred between both countries were powerful. At the same time, in none ot the main concrete questions was there any opposition of a nature which could only be settled by resort to arms. Neither of the two states in question controlled territory which was absolutely necessarv to the other one. If the
