the Crown, but the assent of Parliament, the popularly elected body to a representative chamber, is necessary to constitute a valid treaty in regard to them. But, Sir, setting aside these cases which are well defined, both in principle and in practice, there remains a vast range over which this Treaty power extends. … There is one thing which I think is still higher than the dicta of legal authorities in this important question, and it is our long, uniform, and unbroken course of practice. It is one thing to stand upon the opinion of an ingenious or even a learned man; it is another thing to cite the authority of an entire State, signified in pratical conclusions, after debate and discussion in every possible form, all bearing in one direction and stamped with one and the same character. … Do not let it be supposed that I am in favour of action outside Parliament. … It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in scores of cases cession has taken place, and in all cases the practice has been uniform for the Ministers of the Crown to advise upon their responsibility, for the Crown to act, and for Parliament to accept the results. … If the House of Commons does not approve of a Treaty which has been entered into it can, of course, turn out the Government of the day. … The effect of the present system, therefore, be it theoretically good or theoretically bad, places in the House of Commons the supreme control over o Treaty-making power of the Crown. Is that to be the case after the Treaty-making power has come to be handled by this Bill? It seems to me almost a necessity that out of this proceeding some complications of weight and importance must grow, deeply affecting the relations of the Crown and Parliament and the administration of political power. Speaking roughly, as the matter now stands, we have, virtually, the whole control. The other branch of the Legislature—the House of Lords—cannot turn out a Government. We, if we have votes enough, can. But will that be so after this? No. That which we now have exclusively you invite us to halve with the other branch of the Legislature. Now, I have said I do not wish to make this a Party dispute, and, therefore, I do not want hon. Gentlemen opposite to listen to this, which I offer rather as consideration to Members on this side, who have a natural tendency to say, the more you
