testify to the influence of the book published by Grotius anonymously in 1609. The author had 'of late seene and perused a very learned, but a subtle Treatise (incerto authore[1]) intituled Mare liberum, containing in effect a plaine Proclamation of a liberty common for all of all Nations, to fish indifferently on all kinde of Seas, and consequently, a turning of undoubted proprieties to a community'. The discourse of the unknown author was 'covered with the maintenance of a liberty to saile to the Indians'. At the very outset, says Welwod, 'I cannot passe the Authour his ridiculous pretence … as for a liberty onely to saile on Seas: a thing farre off from all controversie, at least upon the Ocean; specially, since passage upon land through all Regions Christian, is this day so indifferently permitted to all of all Nations, even to Turkes, Iewes, Pagans, not being professed enemies; and therefore much lesse to be restrained on Sea in all respects. So that I cannot but perswade both my selfe, and other loyall subjects, that the said pretence is but a very pretence, and.so much the more to be suspected as a drift against our undoubted right and propriety of fishing on this side the Seas.'[2]
Appeal is made, as by Grotius it had been made in liberal array of learning, to the testimony of the Scriptures and of the Roman jurisconsults, and to that of others. There was considerable stretching of the texts. The central argument of Grotius was that there could be no 'occupation' of the sea.[3] How does Welwod deal with that argument? 'For
- ↑ Grotius's name was given in the edition of 1616. Both the edition of 1608 and that of 1616 were published at Leyden.
- ↑ Grotius's name was given in the edition of 1616. Both the edition of 1608 and that of 1616 were published at Leyden.
- ↑ See, e.g. c. v. of Mare Liberum. 'Things that cannot be occupied, or that never have been occupied, cannot be the property of any one, because all property has its origin in occupation. Further, all things that have been so constituted by nature that, although of use to some one person, they suffice, notwithstanding, for the common use of all other persons, are
