nition it consists only in doing all kinds of evil. The whole discussion is of the same character, so that in conclusion it says:
“5. Common sense on its side cannot help but remark that if divine grace embarrasses man’s freedom and draws it forcibly to the good, then every merit is taken away from a man’s good actions, every incitement to do good, and in general his whole morality is undermined, and the cause of it all is God himself! Can such ideas be admitted? It is true, reason cannot explain in what way the mighty power of God, acting upon man, leaves his freedom intact, and cannot with certainty define their mutual relations; but none the less this mystery must be for us above all doubt, since we have so many grounds for belief that man is not only not deprived of liberty under the influence of grace upon him, but also actively takes part in its action, which takes place in him and through him.” (p. 288.)
That is, in other words, the Theology confesses that it does not understand anything of what it has said, but that it thinks that it is necessary to believe in that mystery, that is, in something meaningless and contradictory, which it is even impossible to express.
Art. 194 continues the tangle, proving that man takes an active part in what divine grace accomplishes in him and through him.
“St. Theodoret: ‘The apostle called it a gift of God not only to believe, but also to suffer gloriously (Phil. i. 29), without rejecting the participation of the free will (of man), but teaching us that the will in itself, deprived of grace, cannot achieve anything good. Both are necessary: our readiness, or desire, to act, and the divine coöperation. And as for those who have not that desire it is not enough to have the grace of the Spirit, even so, on the other hand, the mere desire, not strengthened by grace, cannot gather the riches of the virtues.’” (p. 291.)
