Page:Complete Works of Count Tolstoy - 13.djvu/228

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208
CRITIQUE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY

depends on our will. This dependence on our will exists in us only potentially; it is acquired by us in fact only through our activity. If God, intending to create us, had not said beforehand, ‘We will make’ and ‘after our likeness,’ and if he had not given us the power to be after his likeness, we could not by our own force be after the likeness of God. But as it is we received at creation the power to be like God. But, having given us this possibility, God has left it to us to be the actors of our own likeness with God, in order to be worthy of an acceptable reward for our activity, and that we may not be like soulless representations made by artists.” (p. 458.)

83. Man’s destination is as follows:

“(1) In relation to God this destination of man consists in this, that he shall unalterably remain true to that high bond or union with God (religion), to which the All-good has called him at the very creation, while stamping upon him his image; in order that, in consequence of this calling, he may constantly strive after his Prototype with all the forces of his rational, free soul, that is, in order that he may know his Creator, and glorify him, and live in moral union with him. (p. 459.) (2) In man’s relation to himself, his destination is that he, being created in the image of God with moral powers, shall constantly try to develop and perfect these powers by exercising them in good deeds, and, in this manner, shall more and more become like his Prototype. For this reason the Lord has more than once commanded in the Old Testament: Ye shall be holy; for I am holy, the Lord your God (Lev. xi. 44; xix. 2; xx. 7), and now we hear in the New Testament from our Saviour: Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect (Matt. v. 48). However, this purpose of man is essentially not to be distinguished from the first; on the contrary, it is included in it and serves as a necessary condition for its attainment.” (pp. 460 and 461.)