supply and reinforce his men on the west side of the Canal, and it was over these bridges that the main body of the 137th Infantry Brigade eventually poured to the attack of the defences on the east bank.
If he had realized the magnitude of the projected attack and had retired over the Canal in good time, destroying his bridges behind him, there is little doubt that our casualties would have been immensely greater. Indeed, the attack might conceivably have failed, though in view of the satisfactory weather conditions the latter is unlikely.
A feature of the German resistance was the comparatively small amount of artillery retaliation. A strong barrage fell on our old front line after the troops had left it, and the range was shortened in time to cause us considerable casualties before the leading Brigade had crossed the Canal. Such obvious places as Ascension Valley and other depressions behind our line, where concentration might have been expected, were also heavily punished throughout the morning, until the enemy was compelled by our success to remove his guns in order to avoid their capture, and had lost those guns he had failed to remove. The failure of the enemy's artillery to give a good account of itself must also be attributed to the fog. Had observation been possible, fire could have been directed on our marching columns and transport, and the 138th and 139th Infantry Brigades in particular must have suffered heavy casualties while advancing to their forming-up position on the Red line. The same cause probably accounted for the slight use made by the enemy of his heavy artillery. All his firing in the early morning at such targets as Bellenglise Bridge, Bellenglise itself, and La Baraque had to be done by the map. When the fog cleared later in the day, he must have been feeling very doubtful regarding the safety of his guns, and was
