ed to give effect to such objections, and, in consequence of them, the presentee is rejected in the case supposed. The patron had selected him as the most distinguished, and most eminently qualified man in the Church, and the presbytery applauded the patron's choice. But now the patron is called on to present another, and yet he is not informed for what reason the object of his former choice was unacceptable. However anxious he may be to consult the wishes of the congregation, (consistently with the exercise of his own right of choice,) they furnish him with no means of doing so. To all his anxious demands of explanation, the hard, dry, ungrateful, unreasoning, unchristianlike answer invariably is, "we won't have him." The patron, therefore, is compelled a second time to exercise his right of choice, and in so doing to execute a public trust involving a high responsibility, without any new light—without any additional information. His conscience leads him to select the man whom he believes to be the best fitted for the office—his choice is, of necessity, regulated by the same considerations as formerly—the second presentee will, therefore, naturally very much resemble the first, and for that reason will, in all human probability, be equally unacceptable with the first. Again, therefore, we say, that it argues either dishonesty or short-sightedness in any man to maintain, that the object of the General Assembly's Act will be gained by the mere existence of the power which it confers, without the necessity of its frequent exercise; for the right of Veto cannot possibly influence the patron's choice indirectly and ab ante, while the objections to which the Veto is intended to give effect are unexplained and unintelligible to the patron.
The congregations in the Scotch Church have always, in the settlement of ministers, had the right and the power of scrutinizing the qualifications of the presentee, and, if they saw cause, of stating special objections founded on the deficiency of these qualifications. This certainly, unlike the Veto, was a power more in posse than in esse; and the very existence of the right operated as a check at once on patrons and presbyteries, inducing more diligence and more deliberation in the selection by the former of a qualified person, binding the latter to greater care and strictness in taking trial of the qualifications both of presentees to benefices, and of candidates for license. But such was the natural effect of the people's right, simply because the patron and the presbytery were made fully aware how the objections of the people might, with certainty, be anticipated and obviated—they knew the precise line of duty prescribed to them by the Church, and, in particular, the duty implied in and necessarily arising out of the power vested in the people. No analogy exists between this system and that proposed under the Veto Act. The dissent which the people are encouraged to tender by the Act of 1834, is not founded on objections to the qualifications of the presentee, but is the mere expression of dislike, arising from causes which, if they will bear the light of day at all, are, at least, in point of fact, neither stated nor explained.
After all, then, what is the precise value of acceptableness, apart from qualification? If the presentee be a sound theologian, and an excellent scholar, a man of unimpeachable moral character, of earnest and unassuming piety, active and industrious in his profession, mild and agreeable in his manners—realize such a picture as this, and for our own part we care little whether on first acquaintance he be acceptable to the people or no, because it is impossible that such a man should be many days among them without conciliating the regards of the most prejudiced, and winning the esteem of all. Should it be otherwise, the phenomenon must be accounted for, not by the unfitness of the minister for his office, but by the present lamentable incapacity, or disinclination, of the people of that parish to profit by the instructions even of the most eminently qualified individual. Indulge the mere will of such a congregation give way to their caprice, by arming them with the Veto, and the inevitable consequence must be, that they will reject every man who is highly qualified to reclaim them from their vicious and irreligious courses, and will at last choose him from whose apathy and indolence they anticipate the smallest amount of disturbance—with whom they
