Page:Bankers and Credit (1924).pdf/245

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But surely this would be a most curious effect to follow a great flood of production of cheap goods poured out upon a world which for years had been suffering from scarcity and dearness of goods and over-production of money. From the point of view of the taxpayer and consumer—and we are all of us both—the effect of a big indemnity payment on the countries that receive it would seem to be highly beneficial, if it is used wisely and is not allowed to promote inflation and inflammation as happened in Germany after 1872. We at least could always haye made an excellent use of any money that we were likely to receive from Germany by using it in payment of our debt to America, and after that if there were anything more, in restoring the foreign investments that we had to sell during the war, to the detriment of our strength as a financial centre. Mr. McKenna, however, seemed to think that not only could Germany not produce an exportable surplus, but that it was equally impossible for France or any of the Allied debtors. He thought that Germany could pay something, namely the amount of her foreign assets which he estimated at a billion dollars—£200,000,000. England he showed to be the only debtor possessing any large accumulation of foreign assets—enough