work and gave us neither peace nor war but chaos accompanied by a snarling obligato; and so disillusionment and disenchantment have made us look fools who cherished, during and after the war, hopes that the war would have taught us something. But in their day these hopes were not only real, but had as much justification as many of those with which we comfort ourselves. Moreover some of them may yet come true.
Like a trumpet call they stirred the blood of enthusiasts who thought that this was a good time for reforming our monetary system. Common sense with its stuffy conservatism might suggest that we should first restore our credit machine to its old-time health and efficiency, and then see what could be done towards improving it. But this humdrum policy did not commend itself to the many critics who had always complained of its inelasticity and rigidity. The attack was opened by the late Sir Edward Holden, in his speech to the Shareholders of the London Joint City and Midland Bank, on January 29, 1918. He called the admiring attention of his audience to the principles on which the United States had arranged their monetary system under the new Federal Reserve Banks. Before doing so, he stated that he wished to
