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The direct Alliance with Turkey and Bulgaria and the invasion of the Balkans is the consequence of the full mastery over Austria-Hungary. It is a riddle to me how the politicians in England, France, and Russia could fail to grasp the true meaning of the Triple Alliance, and above all of the peaceful penetration of Austria-Hungary by Germany; they of course paid no attention to the struggle of the Austrian Slavs against the oppressive influence of Germany, nor did they notice the national efforts of Bohemia and the Southern Slavs. So short-sighted they were that they even patronised the principal instrument of Germany, the Magyars, who had skilfully acquired control of Austria’s diplomatic service. Latterly all the more important Austro-Hungarian Embassies have been held by Magyars, the outspoken adherents and tools of Germany, and the Magyar aristocrats influenced and created political opinion not only of the diplomatists, but also actually of the Governments of the Entente-Powers.
In France, it is true, some sympathies were tendered to the Bohemians, and even some practical advances were tried. In Russia the official world was very little touched by the theories and practices of the unofficial Slavophils. Only the Balkan Slavs, the Orthodox Bulgars and Serbs, were officially acknowledged, as also the Greeks.
To-day at least it must be evident that the present situation in the Balkans is the logical outcome of Pan-Germanism; the way to Baghdad was secured and fortified on the battlefields in Russia and France—Belgium. There the dice for Baghdad, for Asia and Africa were cast, and will be cast again.
27.—The War in the Balkans: the three Allied Powers—Britain, France, and Russia—must rely on themselves.
It would be a mistake to say, that the war in the Balkans is secondary—no, it is the continuation of the war in the North. But the decision of the war, and that means, the decision as to the leadership in Europe and Asia, will be fought out in Russia and France. It is a matter of course that the Balkans must be defended by the Allies too. They must send there enough troops to prevent the Germans from occupying Constantinople, encouraging Persia and threatening Egypt and India.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the need for defending Constantinople and the Balkans (Serbia)—one very serious lesson follows from the general situation: the three great Allies must depend on themselves, and on themselves only.
I have said that the question, whether the diplomatists have brought the bad situation in the Balkans upon the Allies, is now of no great consequence. But I go still further. The very fact that they are blaming the diplomatists, proves that they do not grasp the situation, and that they are accusing the Allies of a great weakness. The perpetual negotiations with Greece and Roumania, and with Bulgaria, the whole campaign in the Press, is a lamentable proof that this weakness is not merely diplomatic.
The development of the war and the attitude of the neutrals should have been better understood. One victory in France or Russia, even a moderate victory, will do more than any number of diplomatic démarches. German diplomacy has triumphed in the Balkans, because the German arms have been victorious. Turkey’s adherence to Germany was a very strong example and suggestion for all the Eastern States and Nations. The hesitation and Germanophil tendencies of the other Balkan and Asiatic States are the natural result of Turkey’s example.
