excite our pity, but that by no means reduces pity to a mere selfish apprehension on our own account. “The essence of pity,” says Aristotle elsewhere (‘Poet.’ xxv.), “is that it is caused by the sight of undeserved calamity.” Thus it proceeds from a sense of moral justice arising in the heart. Aristotle does not regard men as the natural enemies of each other; on the contrary, he thinks benevolent feelings to be natural, and to play a considerable part in the organisation of society. He defines “kindness” [1] to be “that quality by which one does a service to him who needs it, not in return for anything, nor in order that one may get anything one’s self, but simply to benefit the recipient.” He considers human nature to be capable of great moral elevation in the persons of the wise and good; at the same time he regarded the majority of mankind as poor creatures, though rather weak than wicked. Thus (‘Rhet.’ II. v. 7), he says,“the majority of men are timid and corruptible,” and in ‘Eth.’ VII. vii. 1, it is said that “most men are in a state between continence and incontinence, but rather verging towards the worse side.”
We may conclude our extracts from the second book of the ‘Rhetoric’ with Aristotle’s remark on the prime of life, which Dr Arnold of Eugby used to be fond of
- ↑ Charis, a word which can hardly be translated, as it means not only kindness, grace, or favour, but also the reciprocal feeling of gratitude for kindness. The Charites or Graces were the Greek personifications of reciprocal feelings of kindness. Hence the temple of the Graces symbolised the mutual services of men to each other, on which society depends (see ‘Eth.’ V. v. 7).
