between man and man, and says that slaves are “barbarians” (i. e., ignorant of the Greek language and Greek manners), and again, that they have not the up-right bearing of freemen trained in the gymnasia. But he admits that “nature” has failed in outwardly marking with sufficient distinctness the inward difference between the slave and his master. Yet still he is not shaken in his doctrine, but even asserts that it is lawful to make war on races which were intended by “nature” to be slaves, and to reduce them to slavery. These views may seem shocking; but yet they admit of some palliation. Christian theologians and divines, till within a very recent time, have defended slavery, appealing in its behalf to the sanction of the Bible; and even the virtuous Bishop Berkeley, while sojourning at Rhode Island, became the owner of slaves. The lot of a slave in Attica seems, generally speaking, not to have been a bad one. And Aristotle, in wishing the “naturally” deficient races of mankind to be brought into bondage, seems to have had some idea of the benefit they would derive from being, as it were, sent to school.
In another matter Aristotle appealed to “nature” not in defending, but in attacking, one of the institutions of society—namely, the putting out money at interest. Aristotle had many of the prejudices of a “gentleman;” we have seen before (p. 109) how he admired a brilliant liberality, and thought little of the virtue of saving. He acknowledged that means must be forthcoming for the maintenance of the family, but; if possible, he would have these means come from the
