Page:American Journal of Sociology Volume 8.djvu/363

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THE SOCIAL WILL 347

case the adaptation is, in general, to the environment at large, but of course especially to the environment as alive with other individual activities. Moved by such a will, the life of society is describable indifferently as friendly rivalry or jealous co-opera- tion, 1 and in one's conception of it the corner-stone is the idea of adaptation. That this notion of the social will as consisting in the conscious, mutually adaptive activities of individuals is, to say the least, not without its difficulties, may be readily admitted, and the difficulties may be so nearly fatal as to be " met- aphysical," or they may be only verbal ; but, without attempt- ing to analyze them too closely, I venture to content myself with considering some of the more important implications of the idea of adaptation nowadays so well accredited.

Adaptation is certainly meaningless apart from resistance, and yet, at the same time, whatever offers resistance must always have some positive participation in the activity resisted, or must, in words of no strange meaning, be developmental in its influ- ence, not merely hostile and resistant. That what resists devel- ops is a difficult paradox, which will nevertheless be generally accepted as true. It is the paradox of the social will. Another paradox, moreover, neither less difficult nor less valid, comes in its wake. Thus and to this we may give first attention not only does the social will consist in the conscious, mutually adaptive and mutually resistant activities of individuals, but also the unity and so the will of society involves a division of society. Society is a divided unity because, and in the sense that, it is a dynamic unity; it is a unity of individuals at once adaptive and resistant. Often we say of ourselves that we are at once our own best friends and our own worst enemies, and just such a condition of inner division and self-opposition, my contention

1 In terms of emotional extremes it is a life that is moved by a mixed hate or a mixed love. Hate alone certainly does not make the world of society go around, nor does even pure, unselfish love. Love and hate, sympathy and jealousy, as if cen- tripetal and centrifugal forces, make the revolutions. With the same meaning we human creatures are given to really hating only those whom we might and, as some have taught us, whom we ought to love most, hate being disappointed or uninformed, and so uninspired, love. Or, again, love is never a loss of individuality, but a rebuff that supports individuality. Hate and love are not two emotions, but the maintaining poles of one.