ETHICS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 157
human and sub-human spheres constitute parts of one general cosmic scheme ; but the implication is still left that the so-called ethical process is both essentially different from, and antagonistic to, that process which is displayed in the lower realms of life. And this leads to the second general question regarding Mr. Huxley's position. This is, whether the ethical process does in fact have, either for its aim or its result, a cessation of the com- petitive principle ; and whether, therefore, the ethical principle does in fact differ in kind from the evolutionary principles of "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest." In other words, cannot we take Mr. Huxley's homely example, and say that, though, to be sure, the two arms in stretching the string do, in a certain sense, pull in opposite directions, yet their modus operandi is essentially the same, and, what is more important, they both have the same aim in view, namely, the stretching or breaking of the twine?
Now, as all agree, the aim of all striving, whether animal or human, is life and development. The difference between the evolutionary process among men and among animals cannot, therefore, consist in the general end sought to be attained. What difference there is can only consist in the different sort of life or development striven for. This, indeed, is a very great difference, but is not one which would distinguish generically the two processes.
Professor John Dewey has called attention to the fact that there is no distinction in kind between those brute instincts which Mr. Huxley calls natural and those higher instincts which he calls moral. 1 The animal impulses and all natural impulses are not per se moral or immoral ; they are the basis for all moral action, and whether moral or immoral depends upon how and for what purpose they are exercised. Thus both natural and social selection operate alike in so far as each implies adapta- tion to environment. The essential difference between the two processes consists, as has been before suggested, in the fact that what is unconscious with the brute is conscious with man, and that with this consciousness comes moral responsibility for the
- lMonist, Vol. VIII, p. 32.
