JJ^i/son : TIic Downfall of Spain 161 have been among the most eager of admirals to join close action with us, even though the odds were against him. This estimate of the man is based upon his bearing and conversation when first brought a prisoner to our ships, while the smoke of battle still hung upon the water. What he actually did, was or seemed to him the best possible with his poorly equipped vessels. He felt it his duty to avoid battle if possible. In so doing he made one false step, choosing to take his squadron to San- tiago rather than to Cienfuegos. It is probable that the cause of his so doing, was that Cienfuegos was nearer to the strength of our fleet than was Santiago, and that he did not reflect that Cienfuegos as a refuge would be supported, if necessary, by the whole strength of the Spanish army in the west of Cuba, while at Santiago he would be practically isolated from all hope of assistance. This mistake in judgment was his only one, but it was very serious in its results. It has been said that his small coal sup- ply made the choice of Santiago necessary, but this is not regarded prob- able by those best acquainted with the situation. The author next considers the American plans of operations. In judging of these, it should be remembered that a naval plan, as well as an army plan, must have some reference and relation to the plan of the sister service, and it is probable that Admiral Sampson's first proposal to attack Havana, of which the author speaks, had in view the landing of an army force shortly afterward, to hold the positions and gather the fruits of any success that the navy might have in any attack. It soon became apparent, however, that the army would not be ready to land in any force, not for days and weeks only, but for months. As to the chances of success at Havana, there seems to the writer but little doubt that an attack, made as Admiral Sampson proposed to make it, and beginning the day after war was declared, would have resulted favorably. The western batteries could have been taken in detail, and, with them destroyed or silenced, the city itself would have been at the mercy of the guns of the fleet. What did actually happen was that, in pursuance of this prohibition of the Department, a blockade was undertaken of Havana and adjacent ports, and a waiting policy was inaugurated. The author has the correct idea of the bombardment of San Juan de Puerto Rico : that it was a reconnaissance necessary in order to make certain that Cervera was not in the harbor, and that Sampson showed wisdom in hauling off" as soon as it was discovered that he was not there. In describing the movement of Shafter's army from Tampa to Dai- quiri, the author has departed from his usual rule of depending upon official reports, and has been led astray by newspaper comments. The convoy was not in more straggling order than was contemplated in the plans ; a rear guard was provided for, which it was expected would gather those vessels together which fell behind. This was all foreseen, and the urgency of the Navy Department's despatches to Captain Taylor as to pushing ahead in order to relieve our marines at Guantanamo, made it most unwise for him to delay the rest of the convoy after he had made all arrangements for guarding the slower ships left behind. As it was.
