is absurd and mischievous, and morally impossible for him to choose to do it. Which also is the very same reason, why the most perfect rational creatures, superior to men, cannot do evil; not because they want a natural power to perform the material action, but because it is morally impossible, that with a perfect knowledge of what is best, and without any temptation to evil, their will should determine itself to choose to act foolishly and unreasonably.
In this he plainly allows the necessity, for which I have contended. For he assigns the same causes of human actions that I have done; and extends the necessity of human actions as far, when he asserts, that a man cannot under those causes, possibly do the contrary to what he does; and particularly, that a man under the circumstances of judging it unreasonable to hurt or destroy himself, and being under no temptation or external violence, cannot possibly act contrary to that judgment. And as to a natural or physical power in man to act contrary to that judgment, and to hurt or destroy himself, which is asserted in the foregoing passage, that is so far from being inconsi-
