Opinion of the Court
the public dialogue.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 633, 642 (1994). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the coercive “[e]liminati[on]” of dissenting “ideas” about marriage constitutes Colorado’s “very purpose” in seeking to apply its law to Ms. Smith. 6 F. 4th, at 1178.
We part ways with the Tenth Circuit only when it comes to the legal conclusions that follow. While that court thought Colorado could compel speech from Ms. Smith consistent with the Constitution, our First Amendment precedents laid out above teach otherwise. In Hurley, the Court found that Massachusetts impermissibly compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment when it sought to force parade organizers to accept participants who would “affec[t] the[ir] message.” 515 U. S., at 572. In Dale, the Court held that New Jersey intruded on the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment rights when it tried to require the group to “propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs” by directing its membership choices. 530 U. S., at 654. And in Barnette, this Court found impermissible coercion when West Virginia required schoolchildren to recite a pledge that contravened their convictions on threat of punishment or expulsion. 319 U. S., at 626–629. Here, Colorado seeks to put Ms. Smith to a similar choice: If she wishes to speak, she must either speak as the State demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs, sanctions that may include compulsory participation in “remedial … training,” filing periodic compliance reports as officials deem necessary, and paying monetary fines. App. 120; supra, at 3. Under our precedents, that “is enough,” more than enough, to represent an impermissible abridgment of the First Amendment’s right to speak freely. Hurley, 515 U. S., at 574.
Consider what a contrary approach would mean. Under Colorado’s logic, the government may compel anyone who speaks for pay on a given topic to accept all commissions on that same topic—no matter the underlying message—if the
