A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (1735)/Preface

by Anthony Collins

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PREFACE.

oo much care cannot be taken, to prevent being misunderstood and prejudg'd, in handling questions of such nice speculation as those of Liberty and Necessity: and therefore, tho' I might in justice expect to be read before any judgment be pass'd on me, I think it proper to premise the following observations.

1. First, tho' I deny liberty in a certain meaning of that word; yet I contend for iberty, as it signifies, a power in man, to do as he wills, or pleases; which is the notion of liberty maintain'd by Aristotle, Cicero, Mr. Locke, and several other Philosophers, antient and modern. And indeed after a careful examination of the best authors who have treated of liberty, I may affirm, that however opposite they appear in words to one another, and how much soever some of them seem to maintain another notion of liberty; yet at the bottom, there is an almost universal agreement in the notion defended by me, and all that they say, when examin’d, will be found to amount to no more.

2. Secondly, when I affirm necessity; I contend only for what is call’d moral necessity, meaning thereby, that man, who is an intelligent and sensible being, is determin’d by his reason and his senses; and I deny man to be subject to such necessity as is in clocks, watches, and such other beings, which for want of sensation and intelligence, are subject to an absolute, physical, or mechanical necessity. And here also I have the concurrence of almost all the greatest Asserters of liberty, who either expressly maintain moral necessity, or the thing signified by those words.

3. Thirdly, I have undertaken to shew, that the notions I advance, are so far from being inconsistent with, that they are the sole foundations of morality and laws, and of rewards and punishments in society; and that the notions, I explode, are subversive of them. This I judg’d necessary to make out, in treating a subject that has relation to morality; because nothing can be true which subverts those things; and all discourse must be defective, wherein the Reader perceives any disagreement to moral truth; which is as evident as any speculative truth, and much more necessary to be render’d clear to the Reader’s mind, than truth in all other sciences.

4. Fourthly, I have intituled my discourse, a Philosophical Inquiry, &c; because I propose only to prove my point by experience and by reason, omitting all considerations strictly theological. By this method I have reduc’d the matter to a short compass: and hope, I shall give no less satisfaction, than if I had consider’d it also Theologically; for all but Enthusiasts, must think true Theology consistent with reason, and with experience.

5. Fifthly, if any should ask, Of what use such a Discourse is? I might offer to their consideration, first, the usefulness of truth in general: and secondly, the usefulness of the truths I maintain towards establishing laws and morality, rewards and punishments in society; but shall content myself with observing, that it may be of use to all those who desire to know the truth in the questions I handle, and that think examination the proper means to arrive at that knowledge. As for those, who either make no Inquiries at all, and concern not themselves about any speculations; or who take up with speculations; without any examination; or who read only books to confirm themselves in the speculations they have received; I allow my book to be of no use to them: but yet think they may allow others to enjoy a taste different from their own.